The financial storm that has been pounding the world economy for more than a year now is showing signs of abating, allowing a first glance at the damage left in its path. Economies have been weakened, internal fault lines exposed, and companies squeezed by reduced demand and the lack of credits. But the worst might be over. Not only optimists take comfort in a number of encouraging developments, which appear to foreshadow a sustainable—though only moderate and potentially jobless—recovery. From a politician’s perspective, it is now critical to draw the right lessons from the deep recession to ensure that post-crisis policy responses will leave stronger foundations and structures more resilient to future economic shocks. This is particularly true for less diversified and smaller economies.

At the moment, there are no external growth engines. Trade with China is too insignificant and growth prospects in the European Union and Russia too weak—notwithstanding recent signs of improvements. The euro-area economy (representing the 16 EU member states that have adopted the common currency) appears to have emerged from its worst post-World War II recession, with initial data confirming (or implying) positive growth rates for both the third and fourth quarters of 2009. Against this backdrop, the European Commission revised upwards its 2010 projection, now expecting euro-area GDP to grow by 0.7 percent (rather than see it decline by 0.1 percent), outweighing the effects from

the disappearing fiscal stimuli and a continued deterioration of lagging indicators, especially unemployment. Still, concerns remain about (i) the combined effects from existing overcapacities and the continued credit squeeze, resulting in private-sector investments to decline even further; (ii) the precarious state of many of the member countries’ public finances, effectively precluding further fiscal stimuli; and (iii) the possibility of a sudden re-emergence of inflationary pressures that could trigger a tightening of monetary policies and an acceleration of the euro’s trend appreciation, placing additional burdens on the export sector.

For Montenegro, the—still very sketchy—data seem to imply that contractionary pressures have bottomed out. The better-than-expected tourist season, the increasingly positive outlook in the energy sector, and preliminary signs of increased banking-sector liquidity are consistent with a possible trend reversal in GDP growth during the third quarter. The situation remains, however, fragile. The unresolved question of the post-crisis viability of a number of key enterprises, which were particularly hard hit in the aftermath of the crisis, creates a broad band of uncertainty around any base-line projection. Only few forecasts can be made with any degree of confidence, including the characterization of the post-independence boom as a unique episode. The “new normal” of the post-crisis situation will look different, and Government will have to formulate policies within the context of altered realities and challenges.

Fiscal constraints will become more binding. The severe demand shock that has followed the crisis will revert only partially—partly for reasons of a more permanent credit tightening by financial institutions. The crisis has taught banks (i) to become generally more risk averse; (ii) to recapitalize, if they can, or otherwise reduce the amount of loans provided to the private sector so as to reduce overall risk exposure; and (iii) increase provisioning to be able to deal with an increasing ratio of non-performing loans. All three factors are particularly relevant for Montenegro’s case. Similarly, it will prove increasingly more difficult to count on (foreign) investors. As 2009 has already shown, the success of one large investment cannot belie the growing list of failed tenders, including in the once exuberant tourism sector. The consequences are clear. Reduced capital inflows lead to lower aggregate demand and a narrowing of the current-account deficit. While welcome from a macroeconomic point of view, lower imports imply a narrower base for value-added tax receipts, an increasingly important element of budgetary revenues during the boom years. The Finance Ministry is painfully aware of this, even more so as, concomitantly, expenditure pressures are increasing, both to service an increased stock of public debt and buffer the most vulnerable segments of society from the worst effects from the crisis.

Lacking a single growth engine means that several smaller motors will have to pull the economy out of the recession and onto a sustainable path towards prosperity. Future growth will have to come from within—placing an even larger premium on competiveness, innovation, and productivity, placing

 reforms to improve the business climate, including for small and medium-sized enterprises, and the education sector at the very top of the political agenda. This is particularly true for the latter point, given the long-term nature of inherent costs and benefits. Broad access to high-quality education is not only the State’s promise of upward mobility to its students but also its own insurance of a sufficient degree of flexibility by its citizens to be able to respond effectively to the challenges of a changing (international) environment. For policy-makers, it is a perennial challenge to keep in sight a country’s “strategic” objectives, especially when economic crises and budgetary constraints present good “tactical” arguments to curtail the resources to schools and higher education institutions, not least because the costs and benefits of related decisions become visible only after several electoral cycles. Budget-induced effects on student enrolment rates and education quality—for better or worse—have lifelong implications for the affected individuals and, often, also for their children and future generations.

As much as it is a Government’s social, moral, and economic responsibility to weigh carefully the consequences of any decision on education budgets, it is the line ministry’s principal obligation to seek ways to balance quality education in schools and universities with stagnant or declining budgetary envelopes. It was thus not surprising—but nevertheless very encouraging—to see the unusually large interest expressed by the high-level participants at the international conference on Financing Higher Education at the Time of Economic Crisis, co-hosted in Budva recently by the Government and the World Bank.

Recognizing that education, qualifications, and skills become more and more critical in defining success and failure in the post-crisis period, conference participants have focused their attention on best ways to approach the management of possibly reduced resources most strategically so as to be able to make (higher) education systems stronger and design the financing particularly of universities with a view to providing incentives to improve quality and efficiency, rebalancing institutional autonomy and accountability for results. Difficult situations lead to innovative solutions that, otherwise, might not have been considered. Where better to start than in the education system? It is not a new lesson, but one that history has proven over and over again, anchored in the insight generally credited to the Greek philosopher and scientist Aristotle more than 2,300 years ago, according to whom education was an ornament in prosperity and a refuge in adversity.

Jan-Peter Olters

World Bank Representative

Country Office Montenegro

Finansijska kriza, koja evo već više od godinu dana udara po svjetskoj privredi pokazuje znake popuštanja, pa nam omogućava da procijenimo štetu koju je iza sebe ostavila. Privrede su oslabljene, loše unutrašnje veze izašle su na vidjelo, a preduzeća u škripcu zbog manje tražnje i nedostatka kredita. Ali najgore je možda prošlo. Sa stanovišta političara, sada je ključno izvući prave pouke iz duboke recesije kako bi potezi nakon krize obezbjedili jače osnove i strukture otporne na neke buduće ekonomske šokove. To posebno važi za male privrede, koje nijesu raznolike.

U ovom momentu nema ničega što spolja vuče rast. Trgovina s Kinom previše je beznačajna, a mogućnost rasta u Evropskoj uniji i Rusiji vrlo slaba - uprkos nedavnim znacima oporavka. Privrede euro-zone (16 članica EU koje koriste zajedničku valutu) izgleda da su izašle iz najgore recesije nakon Drugog svjetskog rata, jer početni rezultati potvrđuju (ili nagovještavaju) pozitivne stope rasta i za treći i za četvrti kvartal 2009. godine. Zbog toga je Evropska komisija izmijenila svoja očekivanja naviše pa tako sada smatra da će rast GDP u euro zoni tokom 2009. biti 0,7 odsto (umjesto ranijeg pada od 0,1 odsto). Takav razvoj situacije prevagnuće nad nestajućim efektima fiskalnih stimulusa i pogoršanjem indikatora, naročito nezaposlenosti. Međutim, još valja biti zabrinut zbog: (1) kombinovanog uticaja postojećeg viška kapaciteta i daljeg nedostatka kredita, što vodi k daljem smanjenju privatnih investicija; (2) nestabilne situacije s javnim finansijama u mnogim zemljama što onemogućava dodatne pakete državnog stimulusa; i (3) mogućnosti iznenadne pojave inflatornih pritisaka što može voditi strožijoj monetarnoj politici i ubrzanju podizanja vrijednosti eura, što sa svoje strane dodatno opterećuje izvozni sektor.

Kad je riječ o Crnoj Gori, čini se da je dno dostignuto. Turistička sezona bila je bolja nego što se očekivalo, sve bolji izgledi u energetici i preliminarni znaci veće likvidnosti bankarskog sektora u skladu su sa mogućnošću preokreta trenda kretanja GDP-ija u trećem kvartalu ove godine. Međutim, situacija i dalje ostaje rovita. Još neriješeno pitanje održivosti jednog broja ključnih firmi nakon krize, koje su posebno bile pogođene, stvara široko polje nepredvidivosti za bilo kakve procjene. Tek nekoliko projekcija može se napraviti s nekom dozom sigurnosti, uključujući i to da je bum nakon nezavisnosti bila jedinstvena epizoda. „Nova normalnost“ nakon krize biće drugačija i Vlada će morati da donosi mjere u okviru promijenjenih realnosti i izazova.

Fiskalna ograničenja moraće više da se poštuju. Oštar pad tražnje, koji je pratio krizu, samo će se djelimično povratiti - dijelom zbog toga što će finansijske ustanove trajnije smanjiti kredite. Kriza je banke naučila da se generalno klone rizika, da se rekapitalizuju, ako mogu, ili da smanje kredite privatnom sektoru kako bi smanjile ukupnu izloženost rizicima, te da povećaju rezerve kako bi mogle da se nose sa sve većim brojem kredita koji se ne vraćaju. Sve ove tri stvari posebno su važne za Crnu Goru. A sve će biti teže računati i na (strane) investitore.

Kao što se već pokazalo tokom 2009, uspjeh sa jednom velikom investicijom ne može nadoknaditi sve veću listu propalih tendera, čak i u nekad cvjetajućem turizmu. Posljedice su jasne. Manji ulazak kapitala vodi nižoj ukupnoj tražnji i tješnjem deficitu tekućih plaćanja. I premda je niži uvoz dobrodošao s makroekonomskog stanovišta, on znači i niže poreske prihode, što je bio važan izvor sredstava u budžetu tokom godina privrednog buma. Ministarstvo finansija je bolno svjesno tog stanja a još više jer, uz to, raste pritisak troškova servisiranja javnog duga i zaštite najranjivijih djelova stanovništva od efekata krize.

S obzirom na to da nema jednog jakog motora rasta, više malih će morati da izvuku privredu iz recesije i povedu je na put održivog napretka. Budući ekonomski rast mora da dođe iznutra - što još više povećava značaj konkurentnosti, inovacija i produktivnosti. To sa svoje strane na vrh političke agende stavlja reforme koje vode boljoj poslovnoj klimi, uključujući i onoj bitnoj za mala i srednja preduzeća i one u obrazovanju. To se posebno odnosi na obrazovanje s obzirom na to da troškovi daju efekte tek na dugi rok.

Širok pristup kvalitetnom visokom obrazovanju nije samo pitanje obećanja Vlade studentima već i pitanje osiguranja dovoljne fleksibilnosti građana da efikasno odgovore na izazove (međunarodnog) okruženja koje se stalno mijenja. Fokusiranje na „strateške“ ciljeve zemlje stalni je izazov za političko vođstvo, posebno u vrijeme kada ekonomska kriza i budžetska ograničenja čine dobar „taktički“ argument da se ograniče sredstva za škole i visokoškolske ustanove, i ne

samo zbog toga što se rezultati njihovih odluka mogu vidjeti tek nakon nekoliko političkih ciklusa. Posljedice budžetskih odluka koje se tiču broja upisanih studenata i kvaliteta obrazovanja - bilo to dobro ili loše - pojedinci osjećaju cijelog života a često se prenose i na djecu i naredne generacije.

I ma kako da je Vlada odgovorna socijalno, moralno i ekonomski za posljedice odluka o obrazovnom budžetu, ipak je to glavna obaveza nadležnog ministarstva koje treba da traži načine da obezbijedi kvalitetno znanje u školama i na univerzitetima dok budžet stagnira ili pada. Zato nije bilo iznenađenje - ali je bilo ohrabrenje - što je neuobičajeno veliki broj visokih zvaničnika prisustvovao međunarodnoj konferenciji „Finansiranje visokog obrazovanja u vrijeme ekonomske krize“, koju su nedavno zajedno organizovali Vlada i Svjetska banka u Budvi.

Shvatajući da obrazovanje, kvalifikacije i vještine sve više i više postaju ključ uspjeha ili propasti nakon krize, učesnici konferencije su se usredsredili na najbolji način upravljanja sredstvima koja možda budu manja. Istraživali su strateške načine korišćenja tih sredstava kako bi osigurali da (visoko)obrazovni sistem bude jači i da tako postave njegovo finansiranje naročito univerziteta kako bi ugradili poticaj da se poboljša kvalitet i efikasnost, da se nađe prava mjera institucionalne autonomije i da se uvede odgovornost za rezultate.

Teške situacije vode inovativnim rješenjima, o kojima u suprotnom možda niko ne bi ni razmišljao. A gdje je bolje početi taj proces nego u obrazovanju? Nije to ništa novo, to je lekcija koju je istorija uvijek iznova potvrđivala, a koja potiče od grčkog filozofa Aristotela od prije 2.300 godina: za njega je obrazovanje bilo ukras prosperiteta i utočište za nedaće.

Jan-Peter Olters

Predstavnik Svjetske banke

Kancelarija u Crnoj Gori